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1.  INTRODUCTION
Is basic science nearly complete in the sense that it has
almost achieved a complete theoretical picture of the
physical word? An affirmative answer would assume that
science is completable; that is, that it can reach a point at
which “everything in the physical world” is explained. I
propose that this assumption is wrong and that complet-
ability is impossible. Furthermore, it is harmful for science
to proceed on the assumption of the validity of this kind of
linear completability, an assumption which is a tenet of what
may be called “scientific fundamentalism” or “scientism”.
However, if science is incompletable it does not mean
there is nothing left for it to do. Indeed, everything of real
importance for humanity is left to do. A recognition of this
incompletability would help us to focus on the achievable,
and that would in turn help us to focus on what ought to be
achieved for human welfare on the basis of the scientific
and technological principles we already have. Within these
recognized external limits of explanation, prediction and
control there is no internal limit to what science can do to
sustain and improve human life, if the political and social
will were to be mustered. When science recognizes and
rebounds from certain transcendent limits, then it will find
itself in a realistic and creative position for confronting
actual human problems on a global scale.
The attempt to complete science in the face of
transcendent incompletability manifests itself in
contemporary difficulties in progressing in (a) theoretical
science, (b) technology (applied science), and (c) the
economy of science, as I shall show with contemporary
examples. I think these interdependent difficulties will
converge in a historical crisis in this century, which I call
(for convenience) the Lambda Limit (Λ Limit). It is far
better to change our understanding and our science policy
before the Λ Limit is reached, at which the collapse of
modern industrial civilization is a real possibility.
2.  CONTEMPORARY VIEWPOINTS
The idea that scientific progress is reaching some kind of
impasse was explored by John Horgan in The End of
Science, first published in 1996 [1]. Horgan surveyed the
idea of scientific progress and its critics, but did not
clearly address the question of incompletability.
I begin with noting how curious the current dominant
view of science is, especially among many scientists
themselves. One rather unthinking view is that it goes on
forever towards some nebulous scientific paradise.
Another view held by quite a few modern scientists and
science writers, but not of course all of them, is that basic
science could be completed, in the sense that it could—
probably quite soon—provide a complete, general,
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explanatory and predictive picture of the physical
universe and, perhaps more than that, even a complete
picture that includes the social and mental domains. By
this they mean that all the basic laws and constants of
nature will be unified, consistent, coherent and complete.
In one respect this view is not very new. In the closing
decades of the 19th century we heard something very
similar from scientists. They believed at that time that
they finally knew what was possible and what was
impossible—all had been explained, or just about. I
emphasize here that my thesis is not about completion,
but incompletability.
The conception I am criticizing is that science made a
slow start, accelerated in growth through the 17th to 19th
centuries, and there will be a final push to complete the
picture, and the graph of growth in knowledge will then be
flat. There will be no more growth, not because science is
incompletable but because it is complete. All that remains
in the science of physics lies “in the sixth place of decimals”
(i.e., in fine details), said Albert Michelson, famous for his
study of the velocity of light [2].
My thesis, I emphasize, is quite different. It is not
that science is or is nearly complete but that it is
incompletable, which is very different. It is an important
matter for scientists and policy-makers to recognize this
and to recognize it earlier rather than later.
The idea of the completability of science, as well as
its comprehensiveness, persists to this day. Cambridge
physicist Stephen Hawking proposed in his 1988 book A
Brief History of Time (which sold over 10 million copies)
that the completion of physics is in sight. In Chapter 10 on
‘The Unification of Physics’ he declares: “… I still
believe there are grounds for cautious optimism that we
may now be near the end of the search for the ultimate
laws of nature”. No doubt emboldened by his own words,
he ends the chapter like this: “A complete, consistent,
unified theory is only the first step: our goal is a complete
understanding [his emphasis] of the events around us,
and of our own existence” [3].
To give just one other example from the many
possible: Francis Crick, Nobel prize-winner of DNA
fame, persevered until his death in 2004 in trying to find a
reductionist explanation even for consciousness. He tried
to reduce consciousness to the physical activity of the
particular neurons that supposedly underlie the ability of
attention. In his 1994 book, The Astonishing Hypothesis,
he writes that,
“… ‘You’, your joys and sorrows, your memories
and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity
and free will, are in fact no more than [GH’s
emphasis] the behaviour of a vast assembly of
nerve cells and their associated molecules” [4].
I am indeed astonished to read this. I am of the view that
while it is true that if there were no such “vast assembly”
in a person’s head then there would be no joy and sorrow,
or even a “person” to have joy and sorrow, but joy and
sorrow in no way derive their significance from this “vast
assembly” but entirely from contexts such as that my wife
has given birth or my grandfather has died. Neither physics
nor neuroscience have the slightest relevance for under-
standing what is joyful or sorrowful about these contexts.
Admittedly, many scientists are also uncomfortable
with the ideas of the fundamentalists like Hawking, Crick
and Richard Dawkins. In the last decade or so leading
scientists are expressing doubts and many have started to
come to terms with the internal limits of science, but not
in a systematic way, and not in a way that has yet had
much impact on scientific thinking or policy. Take, for
example, Professor Paul Davies, a British physicist who
was awarded the Royal Society’s Faraday Prize in 2002
and the Templeton Prize in 1995. In his popular physics
book The Mind of God he seriously doubts whether we
could obtain final knowledge through science, because of
internal theoretical and mathematical limits [5].
However, it seems to me that these doubts have not had
any impact on science and technology policy.
Instead of the model of a flatline graph it is more
fruitful to think of an asymptotic one. An asymptote is a
line that a graph approaches, but cannot possibly
intersect. In the simplest case, a graph of y = 1/x, the line
approaches the x-axis (y = 0), but never touches it. I
suggest that the growth of science on its current basis is
asymptotic, and therefore unsustainable. It grew very
slowly for a long period, accelerated to exponential
growth, is now tailing off and will tend asymptotically to
the horizontal (see Figure 1). In this asymptotic schema
basic science would be—despite some counter-trends—
slowing down, and every decade that passes sees some
growth but less than in the previous decade. Growth
tends to zero but in principle it never actually stops, it just
becomes unsustainable because the resources required to
make the next small step are vast. But it is not just a
matter of resources. I would speculate that things are this
way because human knowledge itself has a limit.
Expecting too much of science results in two kinds
of illusion: that it can go on growing on the same basis for
ever, or that it will flatline when it is complete. This
“expecting too much” is what I call “scientism”, a multi-
purpose framework that explains not just the world of
matter and energy but the human world of love, hope,
war, race hatred, religion, poetry and art. The sciences
and what they have achieved and what they can still
achieve to enhance the human condition are certainly not
in doubt, but scientism is quite another matter. It is a
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species of fundamentalism, and fundamentalism of every
kind always ends up doing harm.
3.  THEORETICAL SCIENCE
We now look at just two cases of theoretical difficulties
that science has in its attempt to make new breakthroughs
of principle and unification. These difficulties are profound
and may ultimately be of a logical or epistemological
nature. First I have a few words about the impact of
Gödel’s Theorem, and recent radical questions about the
laws of nature and constants of nature.
3.1  Gödel’s Theorem
Until 1930 mathematicians generally assumed that there
must be a procedure that could demonstrate the truth of
all the mathematical propositions in an axiomatic system.
After all, if there were no such guaranteed procedure
then how could we be sure that there weren’t contradictions
in that system? In 1930 Kurt Gödel showed that this
assumption was false [6]. There is no such procedure of
complete decidability. It meant that the consistency (or
freedom from contradiction) of arithmetic cannot be proved
by arithmetic itself. This was an enormous shock to scientists
as well as mathematicians, for physics and other disciplines
depend on mathematics. The idea that science rested on
solid mathematical foundations underwent an earthquake.
The arguments and disagreements among scientists,
mathematicians, logicians, computer scientists and
philosophers continue to this day. Does this mean the
great scientific project is incompletable? Some eminent
thinkers believe so, and others do not. Even the experts
cannot decide [7].
3.2  Inconstant constants
The words heading this section formed the title of a
revolutionary article in Scientific American in 2005 [8].
The idea that there are physical constants (i.e., physical
quantities that are universal and fixed in time on which
the laws of nature depend) is the bedrock of the great
scientific enterprise. For science to be possible it has to
be assumed that some things stay the same. If constants
are not constant after all, then the whole edifice starts to
shake. Science would be revealed to be partial,
piecemeal or provisional. Such constants include the
speed of light in a vacuum (roughly 186 000 mph), the
gravitational constant, Planck’s constant, and the fine
structure constant that characterizes the strength of the
electromagnetic interaction.
But have constants always been the same? Some
scientists are beginning to think not. And then there is the
thorny question of why constants have the particular
quantity that they do. They are not derived from theory,
they are just peculiar numbers obtained from observation
or experiment and parachuted into the theories to make
them work—and work they generally do, up to a point.
Some of these constants are really important. The tiniest
variation in just one of these constants and we humans or
even matter itself could not be here at all.
Take the fine structure constant: it has a currently
accepted value of about 1/137.035999074 [9]. One
argument for the fine structure constant being what it is
really opens the door to incompletability. It is that the
constant is what it is because we human observers exist.
This is the Anthropic Principle, which has caused great
controversy among scientists as to whether it is a
scientific way of approaching matters at all. According to
that principle, if this constant were different from what it
is then there would be no carbon and therefore no life and
no humans and no scientists to ponder the fine structure
constant [10]. Therefore, there is no reason to assume
that this constant is an absolute feature of the “universe”
or “reality”; it is what it is because we humans are here as
observers.
Richard Feynman, possibly the greatest physicist of
recent times (a Nobel Prize-winner, who died in 1988)
said of this constant, in exasperation: “It’s one of the
greatest damn mysteries of physics: a magic number that
comes to us with no understanding by man. You might say
the ‘hand of God’ wrote that number, and we don’t know
how He pushed the pencil” [11].
Could it be that the unanswerability of “Why 1/137?”
is somehow connected with the incompletability of
theoretical science?
3.3   Is theoretical science limited?
What the Gödel Theorem and the nature of physical
constants may show, when taken together with a wide
range of other theoretical difficulties, is that the more the
Figure 1. The rebound of science.
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computational complexity of theoretical science increases
the smaller and smaller are the increments in real
knowledge and principle. That is, there are diminishing
marginal knowledge returns on the increasing complexity
of its theoretical basis.
Where does that take us? Nobel laureate Steven
Weinberg put it this way: “The more the universe seems
comprehensible, the more it seems pointless” [12].
However, Weinberg, a brilliant scientist who belongs in
the camp of scientism, insists on believing it is becoming
more comprehensible when—as it seems to me and in
fact to many leading scientists—this strains credibility.
Take Niels Bohr, one of the founders of quantum
mechanics, who said of quantum theory that if you are
not bewildered by it you have not understood it [13].
4.  TECHNOLOGY (APPLIED SCIENCE)
In applied science we now encounter great difficulties in
making breakthroughs with any significant applications
that could solve major current problems. My two examples
here are pharmaceutical medicine and nanotechnology.
4.1  Pharmaceutical technology
The pharmaceutical industry is facing unprecedented
problems. A 2010 graph based on an expert data analysis
of the number of new drugs approved per billion dollars
spent over a 60 year period shows a steady, inexorable
decline [14]. As James Le Fanu explains in his book The
Rise & Fall of Modern Medicine (1999), this decline
was not just due to the tightening of regulations because
of toxicity concerns in the wake of the Thalidomide
calamity [15] (the development costs of each new drug
sky-rocketed not just ten times but as much as 40 times).
Another cause is that it turned out that human physiology
and the disease process are much more complex and
difficult to understand than had been assumed. Despite
some important new drugs, such as those for AIDS, most
of the apparently new ‘blockbusters’ are just improvements
on existing drugs. This points to the need to design drugs
scientifically (i.e., biologically) rather than adopt a hit-and-
miss approach.
One might think that the 3000 million dollar Human
Genome Project has revitalized pharmaceuticals and
medicine; in the year 2000 Bill Clinton asserted it would
“revolutionize the diagnosis, prevention and treatment of
most, if not all, human diseases” [16]. The fact is that the
connexion between the genome and disease is very
complex, not to say fuzzy, and the benefits have been
very few indeed, as recent studies have shown. To take
one: A Boston medical research team gathered 101
genetic variants that showed statistical links to cardiac
disease in genome-scanning studies. The variants proved
to have no value at all in predicting disease among the
19,000 women who had been followed over a 12 year
period. In fact, the research group reported that the old-
fashioned method of obtaining a family history was more
useful [17].
Gradually the pharmaceutical industry has turned for
profits to so-called life-style drugs like Regaine for
baldness and Viagra for impotence. It is also casting an
eye at nanotechnology.
4.2  Nanotechnology
I have been involved in social research in three EU-
funded nanotechnology projects for a number of years [18].
It is said to be an exciting new field. However,
nanotechnology is easily misunderstood. It is not a
specific technology but rather a significant shift in the
scale at which existing technologies can operate. The
ability to manipulate matter at the nanoscale (i.e., the
scale of viruses and small bacteria) is breathtakingly
complex and clever, and promises to be very useful [19].
Familiar kinds of matter (say, carbon, gold or titanium
dioxide) behave quite differently at such a small scale and
this is what holds out a promise of innovation for new
applications and—it has to be said—new toxicity risks.
We shall be seeing many more nanotechnology applications
in electronics, energy, new materials, agriculture, food
industry and in medicine. But there is nothing particularly
new here so far as basic science is concerned. It is not a
theoretical breakthrough like Newtonian mechanics,
quantum theory or the DNA helix.
The cost of nanotechnology research facilities (e.g., for
nanometrology and the characterization of nanomaterials)
is very high. A superlative, multifunctional atomic force
microscope can cost over £1M, and it has to be run and
maintained by experts. The development of efficient and
effective nanoscale processes for the industrial
manufacture of nanomaterials and devices is also
expensive. For example, one will need new complex
machinery and clean rooms of an exceptional standard,
and newly skilled technicians. Many companies are not
convinced that the returns are worth the investment in
developing new applications, despite a lot of financial
support being given by the EU and other governments.
The American research and development budget for
nanotechnology runs into billions of dollars [20].
In the case of EU support—which I know well—just
the logistical support required for getting the experts in
different countries to know each other and share
knowledge and facilities runs into hundreds of millions of
Euros per year—before the real laboratory research has
even started. There are risks. The investment required to
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really understand and manage the toxicity implications of
nanotechnology in the realm of occupational, public and
environmental health and potential ecological damage is
prohibitive. The resultant uncertainty about risk and the
fear of a regulatory clampdown inhibit industry. In my
published research in 2010 with Dr Michael Riediker, an
occupational health expert in Switzerland, I found that the
European experts working in occupational and public
health, or in human and environmental toxicology, believe
that we still do not sufficiently understand the impact of
manufactured nanomaterials on living systems [21]. This
is a source of concern for them, especially since there are
already over 1,000 different nanotechnology consumer
products on the market.
Nanotechnology most certainly has a positive rôle.
The cost and environmental damage of many standard
(non-nanotechnology) industrial processes can be
substantially reduced by introducing nanotechnology
(such as nanocatalysts, filters and strong, lightweight
materials). But without a radical change in our very
conception of the associated economics and science (i.e.,
its limits, rôles and priorities), it may not attract sufficient
public and private investment to bring the kinds of benefits
that society so desperately needs. Too much nanotech-
nology is currently going into enhancing consumer goods
such as cosmetics, sun-block creams, sports drinks, go-
faster skis and car polish and not enough into the super-
strong super-lightweight composites and energy-related
industries that we need to confront the environmental and
energy crises. Industries may need public financing to
make their transition to a higher level of sustainability; it is
not yet forthcoming and in the present economic climate
may never be.
Finally, there is a serious issue of complexity and
interaction at the nanoscale. Can nanotechnology R&D
overcome the technological blockage of inadequate
nanomaterial characterization (i.e., understanding the
physical properties of substances at the nanoscale) in
what is a theoretical environment of unprecedented
uncertainty and indeterminacy? Without adequate
characterization, nanotoxicology, too, remains largely on a
rudimentary, case-by-case, post hoc basis.
4.3  Technology limited?
Again, what these and similar examples may well indicate
is that increases in technological complexity are resulting
in smaller and smaller increments in important
technological applications. In other words, there may be
growing evidence for diminishing marginal returns of
significant technological applications from the increasing
scale and complexity of emerging technologies such as
nanotechnology and biotechnology.
5.  THE ECONOMY OF SCIENCE
We also find difficulties in the economy of science; that
is, how to continue to provide the funding, skills and
infrastructures for the research and development returns
needed. Is there evidence of a growing crisis of the same
general form as the two described above, namely, an
asymptotic approach to a limit?
5.1  Atomic physics and particle colliders
The Large Hadron Collider (LHC) is a European particle
collider, and is the world’s largest and most powerful. It
lies in a tunnel 17 miles in circumference near Geneva
and took 10 years to build. It was switched on recently,
promptly blew a gasket at a cost of at least £24M to
repair, and we now await an interpretation of the
accumulating scientific findings [22]. Its purpose is to
search for a new family of atomic particles including the
so-called Higgs Boson. Some scientists think that the
findings may enable them to build that elusive, complete
ultimate theory of the physical universe.
Does the cost justify the information we shall gain?
Who knows? If the collider does find new and smaller
particles then will that actually complete the physical
picture? Will scientists be satisfied, or will they require an
even larger collider to find out something even more
refined and abstruse at a cruder and grosser price?
The Americans were one step ahead for a while,
trying to build an even bigger collider, but then they
thought better of it. The American Congress in 1993 decided
to stop the $8 billion Superconducting Supercollider
Project to discover entities beyond quarks. $2 billion had
already been spent on digging a 15 mile-long tunnel in
Texas [23]. Was this cancellation the wisdom of limits
or the economic reality of the limits of Big Science
experiments; or in some way both?
The question, in short, is whether the cost is worth it
in terms of the projected returns to society, returns that
make a difference in sustaining that society.
5.2  Fusion energy
The International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
(I.T.E.R.) is the scientific and technological project to end
all projects, a gamble of enormous proportions. It promises
a solution to modern civilization’s ever-growing demand for
energy in the face of dwindling oil resources and the
management of the output of global warming gases. The
idea is not to split atoms, but to fuse atoms, which releases
the same kind of energy as that emanating from the Sun.
This project is well under way in Provence on a
massive building site, with an expected total cost of
15 thousand million euros, but already suffering overspends.
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Recently, Brussels approved another overspend of 1.3
thousand million euros, despite the grave EU financial
crisis [24].
It must be remembered that I.T.E.R. is not a project
to produce energy and plug it into national grids. It is an
experiment to find out if we can produce energy in this
way. In other words, it may not work, and so far fusion-
based energy has spectacularly failed to work. There are
two technological questions of great complexity requiring
solutions: firstly, can we produce the energy in
worthwhile amounts and, secondly, having produced it
can we control it and keep it in its container? Then, of
course, it has to be commercially viable. Pierre-Gilles de
Gennes is reported as saying of this project: “We say that
we will put the Sun into a box. The idea is pretty. The
problem is, we don’t know how to make the box” [25].
The direct benefits of fusion so far are probably zero. Not
a few voices are saying that the project smacks of
desperation and that there is a range of more promising,
simpler and more economically and technologically
distributed energy alternatives in which science and
technology funders should invest.
In the case of fusion energy we cannot plot a graph
of investment against marginal returns because at present
all we have is investment and no returns. A series of
smaller experiments over the past several decades has
been rather disappointing—more power was put in than
one gets out. If one day fusion power does work it would
have the advantage of yielding massive amounts of
energy with very little long-term nuclear waste. But will it
work? No one knows. Some experts are very sceptical.
The USA has cut back on its fusion budget. Meanwhile,
in Europe the head of research at the French National
Council for Scientific Research, Sebastien Balibar, thinks
that the technology is inadequate for the task and that
taking the cost from the public budget for science is
unacceptable [26].
In this area too, then, we may see diminishing
marginal returns or even, dare I say it, a continuation of
zero marginal returns.
5.3  Scientific development economically limited?
Financial investment in techno-economic complexity is
becoming a very risky business, which even governments
and very large corporations hesitate to embrace. I realize
that in the case of all the examples I have given there are
counter-trends; the difficulty is discerning the overall
trend, and I venture the hypothesis that the overall trend
is tending to the Λ Limit some time this century.
It would certainly support my incompletability thesis
if we could establish the nature of long-term historical
trends in expenditure on scientific research and
development. I browsed through some of the literature on
this and found it to be very fragmentary, incomplete, hard
to compare and difficult to draw conclusions from. This is
hardly surprising, I suppose. In one interesting graph we
see that over a period of about half a century, for the
USA, there has been a great increase overall, as a
proportion of GDP, which has arrived at a plateau in
recent years [27]. It would be most revealing for
researchers into the “economics of science” to look
further into the data underlying this crucial issue. The
two big questions here are (1) what is the rate of return to
society on these increases? and (2) when does it become
politically impossible to increase the proportion of GDP
going to R&D?
We can now perhaps begin to hope for some deeper
grasp of the multidimensional problem from which we started:
whether science has a limit and, if so, of what nature?
6.  COMPLEXITY
Joseph Tainter has thrown some light on the
contemporary impasse of science and technology. He is
a professor of anthropology and in his book The Collapse
of Complex Societies (1988) he puts forward a thesis
about the cost of increasing complexity in industrial
society [28]. He looks at the collapse of previous
civilizations such as the Roman and concludes that
civilizations grow because they solve layers of problems
with increasing complexity. However a point is reached
when collapse becomes a real possibility because their
investments in social complexity and their energy subsidies
reach a point of diminishing marginal returns. We see
impending collapse when a civilization starts rapidly
disposing of significant layers of its complexity, such as
cancelling huge projects, delayering bureaucracy and
dumping outlying areas. We might add to this list: severe
environmental damage, widespread financial instability,
deepening inequality and popular uprisings and riots.
Contemporary evidence for diminishing marginal
returns, says Tainter, is to be found not only in R&D but in
agriculture; minerals and energy production; investment
in health; education; government, military and industrial
management; the productivity of GNP for producing new
growth; and some elements of technical design
improvement. Tainter concludes: “It is clear that some
industrial societies are now experiencing declining
marginal returns in several crucial and costly spheres of
investment” [29].
I would hazard a guess that these difficulties,
because they are interdependent in complexity, will
converge and intersect in a point of unsustainability, a
crisis or tipping-point that I have called the Λ Limit. It is
far better to change our understanding and our science
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policy before the Λ Limit; for then it will provide us with
the opportunity to rebound to a liberating reflexive
science, in which the difficulties are on a path of
resolution. There are several ways to go—slow decline,
catastrophic decline (collapse), an unstable plateau
(which cannot last indefinitely), or a new upward curve
(Figure 1). An upward curve (i.e., a measure of human
welfare returns on investment in science) requires a
different conception of the scientific enterprise. Further
linear progression of the enterprise we have had for the
last century could be self-destructive.
7.  REFLEXIVE SCIENCE
I think it is possible to rebound from the Limit and defeat
diminishing marginal returns. Dare I say that in reflexive
science, with the underpinning reductionist model
abandoned, scientism would no longer hold sway either
intellectually or in terms of the consumption of research
resources. Instead, at the centre of scientific endeavour
we might choose to put sustainability within the limits of
science, technology and economy—with a new materials
science, green energy alternatives, green chemistry and
chemical engineering, clean water for all, agriculture without
toxins and manmade genetic risk, housing for all, education
for all, productive waste management, as well as expanded
sciences of ecology, anthropology and political ethics.
Reflexive science is based on the reasoned rejection
of scientism (scientific fundamentalism). It puts the
identification of the purpose of science nearer to the
people who should benefit from it, and further away from
corporations, the military establishment, and even the
science establishment. In a globalized world, this would
mean nearer to the needs of the world population. This in
turns entails the identification of the long term welfare
priorities of scientific endeavour. Only then would
policy-makers be well placed to consider the content of
scientific projects. I have argued the case elsewhere for
this approach with nanotechnology [30].
In science itself we need regional and global
cooperation on new energy sources, pollution remediation,
revival of biodiversity and forests, more equitable food
and water industries, the prevention of epidemic diseases,
affordable housing, better sanitation, the mitigation of
flood and drought risk, waste disposal (especially of toxic
materials), a clean atmosphere, addressing the environ-
mental causes of cancer and neurological disorder,
understanding the human psychology of prejudice and
denial, authoritarianism and war, understanding biodiversity
and ecology, monitoring climate change, proposing
sustainable people-centred alternatives to the capitalist
growth economy—an endless list. Is this not enough for
science and technology to get on with?
The Nobel Prizes of the future will perhaps be for
those who contribute to solving these problems. If not,
then a new global prize needs to be created, and I
suggest a Noble Prize rather than a Nobel Prize. If we
can do this, then big speculative science will be subdued
and well-reasoned, evidence-based, testable and verifiable,
purposeful science will flourish. What I have said does
not entail the end of science, but the end of a particular
conception of science.
To give some concrete reality to the question of
priorities in science and technology expenditure I wish to
mention the growing global need for water and the
scourge of malaria. I spent 12 years of my life teaching in
Africa, so my experience of these issues is perhaps more
direct than that of many people in the developed world.
7.1  Malaria and water
About two-thirds of a million people die of malaria every
year, most of them children. One analysis indicates that
full prevention and treatment measures in the worst-hit
African countries would only cost about $2.2 billion per
year for 5 years [31].
The lack of clean water kills and debilitates millions
of people every year. The World Bank estimates the cost
of reaching “basic levels of coverage … in water and
sanitation” to be at least $9 billion, or $30 billion a year for
“achieving universal coverage” for water and sanitation [32].
Now compare these figures with those I gave earlier
for scientific projects. It might be said that science has
already given us the tools to deal with these issues, so the
real problem is the political will. That is, the problem does
not lie with the scientists, technologists and engineers. I
consider this to be evasive thinking. Science, at the end of
the day, especially publicly funded science is nothing but
our own decision-making and is everyone’s responsibility.
With a wholehearted scientific and technological assault on
the major problems of humanity—as was the case in
putting a man on the Moon—they could probably be solved
much more quickly and cheaply. This assumes, of course,
that existing knowledge is sufficient and that the challenge
is of an engineering nature. We have to keep in mind that
not solving the water crisis will eventually cost more than
this, and possibly more than the global economy can bear.
My resolution of our encounter with the Λ Limit,
then, is that a new upward curve requires more than just
more science and technology on the same basis as before—
it needs a new conception of science, reflexive science.
8.  CONCLUSION
A substantial part of our current human problem is a
failure to recognize limits and the arrogance that goes
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with that. So, I would like to conclude with a sobering and
very simple fact about human ignorance provided for us
by science itself. And that is: we cannot possibly know
what is outside the humanly observable universe. No
improvement in instruments or techniques will allow us to
overcome this problem. This is due to the fact that our
observable universe is constrained by the speed of light
[33]. We cannot know anything at all about what is
beyond our observational horizon. Is our visible universe
a finite part of a whole, and if so how big a part? Is it
instead an infinitesimal part of an infinite universe? Is it
typical of the rest of the whole, or not? We do not know
the answers to these questions, and we can never, ever
know. It also means we cannot ever be certain we
understand the origin of the whole universe, despite the
impression given by some promoters of scientism.
Perhaps, then, it is time for us to start deploying
science to put our own small and still rather lovely house
in order.
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